Unravelling the Norton Scam – Final Chapter

Gotcha! We found out who is responsible for this massive scam. Using OSINT and social engineering we tracked down the company behind the Norton Scam.

Chapter 1 – It all starts with a bad sock puppet

Chapter 2 – The Art of OSINT

Chapter 3 – What’s the big deal? And who’s to blame?

Chapter 4 – The more, the better

Chapter 5 – Mistakes on social media

Chapter 6 – Tracing ownership

Final Chapter – Putting the pieces together

Time to finally unravel the Norton scam. Sector and I have decided to conclude our investigations and put the pieces together, after spending countless hours working on this case. Every time we thought we had figured it out, new information was found, taking us down another rabbit hole. Sometimes we spent days following a lead, just to find out that it wasn’t related to our case at all. As with most investigations, we were not able to solve all mysteries, but we are pretty sure we identified the company and some individuals behind this massive scam scheme.

In the last chapter, we pointed out how everything led to specific Indian phone number (+91.9540878969). This number was used to register many of the domains we were looking into. Once more, I decided to make some phone calls to India. I found out that the number belongs to a web design office. The first four phone calls were answered by different men who did not understand English, so they hung up on me. My fifth phone call was more successful. I got a hold of a woman named Priya and told her that a friend of mine had recommend them and that I was looking to have a website set up for me. I had called the right place and I would need to speak to her boss, Priya explained. I also mentioned that the site was to be used as a scam site to obtain credit card data. This too was possible according to Priya. Soon afterwards I had a conversation with the boss, who remained nameless. If I was willing to pay roughly 150$ on PayPal, they would set up the site I needed. With these phone calls, we have proven that the web design office was responsible for setting up the type of scam sites that we have seen throughout our investigations.

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During our research, we also came across a site which offered web design services to US customers and to which we had actually found legit websites they had created. This is something very common: using a US frontend to sell IT-services that are performed in India. So, not everything the team did was illegal or scam-related.

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In order to promote the scam sites, another team was responsible for search engine optimization (SEO). The SEO team was most likely also located in the offices of the web design team, probably under the same leadership. Their job is to flood the internet with backlinks in order to promote the scam sites. So far, we have found more than 20,000 entries for this cause. From Facebook posts, to Medium blogs, to comments on non-related webpages; a large variety of backlinks were created in the past year.

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As mentioned in chapter 3, the purpose of the scam is have the victims call one of the tech support phone numbers. Thus, a team of call center agents is required. Remember how the scam works? If an unsuspecting victim calls the number, they provide ‘assistance’ by obtaining remote access to the victim’s computer. In some cases malware is installed, in other cases they ask for credit card data in order to bill the customers for their service.

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These call center agents were hired by a company named 4compserv, which is located at an address that was also used to register some of the identified scam domains. We suspect this is root of all evil, the company behind the scheme. Or at least some employees of the company, since we have also found evidence of 4compserv conducts legal business as well.

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More evidence came up, which proves that the web design office and the call center are definitely related. Shortly after I had spoken to the boss of the web design office, I received a phone call from the number linked to the call center (+91.97117613). Unfortunately, I missed the call and haven’t been able to reach them ever since. Furthermore, one of the scammers I had personally texted with recently updated the CV on his website. Have a look at his current jobs:

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While there are still some questions to be answered, our research has enabled us to have an overall understanding of the network and the techniques used to run their scam, as well as identifying the company most likely behind this scam: 4compserv in Noida, India.

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Along the way, we would often stumble upon funny facts. Some of the scam developers were just so sanguine, they didn’t want to obscure their tracks. Such as the preferred use of the name ‘Nancy Wilson’ to register domains or create sock puppets. The original websites the scammers had set up were very crude, now it seems they are using nice looking WordPress templates, including chatbots. Usually, the chatbot would ask for a phone number, so the scammers can call back. And guess who you would be chatting with on all of these sites? Good ol’ Nancy!

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We’re done! We managed to find the perpetrators behind all this. What started with a sock puppet on Medium led to unravelling a largescale scam network, targeting unsuspecting victims seeking tech support. We hope that our project may help counter the threat originating from this specific scam and raise awareness for similar schemes. Also, thanks to many of our readers for sharing the posts from this series on Twitter and LinkedIn, ultimetely ranking the articles higher and higher on Google. Using OSINT and social engineering to enable counter-SEO against the scammer’s massive SEO effort!

Now it’s time to relax a bit…before we start the next awesome project!

Sector035/Matthias Wilson – 25.08.2019

We explicitly decided to keep the disclosure of personal information on the investigated individuals to a minimum in these blog posts. However, the complete information gathered is available to law enforcement and/or the companies targeted by this scam upon request.

Unravelling the Norton Scam – Chapter 2

Art is often considered the process or product of deliberately arranging elements in a way that appeals to the senses or emotions. OSINT is art and sometimes OSINT produces art.

This is the second chapter of a series of short blog posts covering the investigation of a massive online scam network. If you are a new reader, I would advise you start with the first chapter to understand the context of this project.

The Art of OSINT

This is big! So far, we have collected information on hundreds of different entities; including websites, names, phone numbers, email addresses and much more. When we started, relevant data was just dumped into a text file. We also used Hunchly during our collection and then realized we needed to structure the most important data and moved on to a spreadsheet. This worked for a while, until we felt the need to display links between entities in an easy and understandable way. A more visual approach was chosen, and Sector started what I call “The Art of OSINT”: a link chart.

Sector used Maltego for our case, but there are many alternatives you can use as well. I have grown fond of draw.io and others might use one of the various mind mapping apps and platforms. The idea behind link analysis in general is to evaluate relations and connections between entities. Link charts are the visualization of this data, which in many cases make it easier for an analyst to discover connections. Sometimes the connections are not direct, but indirect, linking entities to each other by a third-party individual.

Let us take a look at how link charts can be built from scratch. In the first chapter of our series, I posted a screenshot of one of the scam sites.

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On here I already have multiple pieces of information that I can connect. A name, a postal address, a phone number and lastly an email address. Each of these is the starting point for further OSINT investigtions. We found that the email address was used to register the domain allbagmanufacturing(dot)com. This domain also lists an Indian phone number in the WHOIS data.

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It turns out, that the Indian phone number was also used to register the site roadrunneremailsupports(dot)com.

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In conclusion, both sites are likely connected. However, how do we know that this phone isn’t just a burner phone or a random phone number? More OSINT research is required to verify if the phone number is existent and who it belongs to. I also mentioned a little social engineering coming up, didn’t I? If you were hoping to read about this topic in the second chapter of our journey, I have to disappoint you. Rest assured, we have a nice story on social engineering in one of the later chapters. Now, let’s get back to our link analysis.

One piece of information leads to another and soon we find new leads and many connections between the entities. The chart itself has grown quite a bit in the meantime. At first glance, it will seem a bit chaotic. However, it is still easier to handle than relaying this information in a text-based form. For me, link charts have an artistic character. Each chart, whether built manually or automated, is one of a kind. Unique data, unique arrangements, all coming together to form a piece of modern art.

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Put this on a large canvas, have Sector sign it and it would be something that could be found in the Guggenheim Museum of Modern Art. One day I plan to do exactly that. A vernissage on “The Art of OSINT”. Until then, let’s keep creating more masterpieces with our online investigations and link charts.

Sector035/Matthias Wilson – 04.08.2019

Tracking a Hacker with OSINT

My blog has been hacked! Someone defaced the page and looking into the technical details didn’t provide any leads to the culprit. Maybe OSINT can help in this case.

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Today’s article will look into cyber attribution and how OSINT can help identify the perpetrator of a cyberattack or other hacking exploits. Keep in mind, as long as the perpetrator does not make any mistakes it will be hard to track him down. Even if the actual person behind an attack cannot be found, hints on the hacker’s background may help narrow things down to a specific target group or origin. Let us have a closer look at the defacement shown above.

As stated, looking into technical details (IP-address, code, etc.) did not reveal anything useful. So we have to take a closer look at the tag and handle that was placed on our site. A reverse image search was conducted and did not show any results. The hacker goes by the name “drag0nw1ng١٩٨١”, this exact search-term also came up inconclusive. The Arabic numbers in the handle may be an indicator for the hacker’s cultural background. Next up, we will search for the handle in different variations, including a “standardized” one:

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Not many results to look at here, so we can easily go through each and every page. Next to a Russian PlayStation profile named Dragonwing1981, we stumble upon some interesting results that might be related to our case.

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Several data-breaches and leaks show an email address using the exact name. Dragonwing1981@yahoo.com was registered to a member of an internet forum called Kataib Hezbollah. This forum in Arabic language no longer exists and was used to disseminate terrorist propaganda. Since our hacker used Arabic numbers in his handle and the handle seems quite unique (based on the low amount of Google results), the email address might be linked to our guy.

The oldest mentioning of “dragonwing1981” came from another internet forum. In August 2004, the forum was hacked by someone with the email address we found before:

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Research done by the forum members linked the perpetrator to Iraq:

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Looks like things are coming together. There is one more approach we can try, in order to back our claims further. When using the password reset function in Yahoo, it gives you parts of the phone number (without the country code). Let us see what happens, when we try to reset Dragonwing’s password:

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07 is the operator code used by Iraqi mobile networks and the length of the number also fits Iraqi mobile phone numbers. Luckily, Yahoo (unlike Google) displays the exact amount of digits of a phone number.

Let us review the evidence we have collected so far:

  • Use of Arabic numbers in the handle
  • Unique handle, not found often on the internet
  • Username and a related email address found in an Arabic internet forum
  • Email address used in a hack in 2004, identified as possibly originating from Iraq
  • Phone number linked to the email address possibly an Iraqi mobile phone number

Can we be sure that all these pieces of evidence are really linked to each other? Not really, but that is why we use words of estimative probability in intelligence analysis. Cyber attribution is not always about tradecraft, infrastructure or the malware/attack itself. Digging into individual actors may help shed light upon the origins of cyber-attacks and the OSINT process shown above should always be incorporated into any research effort as soon as “personal data” (e.g. tags, names, handles) is involved.

Of course, we could just send Dragonwing1981 an email and congratulate him on his defacement. However, unlike other stories on my blog, this one is completely made up and is based on a CTF-task I created for the OSINT courses I instruct. As far as I am concerned, Dragonwing1981 is innocent…

Matthias Wilson / 02.05.2019

The Nigerian Prince from South Africa

Great, another Nigerian prince in your inbox. Instead of deleting it, why not answer for a change. I did and it turned out to be quite interesting.

Last week, I received my first Nigerian prince scam mail (also known as 419-scam) in German. I assume someone put a lot of work into this, so I thought I would answer. Although the message was apparently sent from jefaturaestudiositurbi@valencia.es, I was to reply to wong.shiu@accountant.com. This email supposedly belonged to Mr. Wong, the banker who was handling the case.

Let us have a look at the message header first, before answering.

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Even if I would have answered to jefaturaestudiositurbi@valencia.es, the email would have been sent to wong.shiu@accountant.com. I assume the email was not actually sent from the @valencia.es domain in the first place and that this was just used to bypass my spam filter. Next up, I wanted to see if I could find any leads to where the email was sent from.

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The initial ‘Received’ entry in the message header points to a South African IP-address belonging to a mobile provider. It also appears to have been sent through a Huawei 3G/4G WiFi router.

Next up, I set up a new Gmail account to communicate with this Nigerian (South African) prince. Sure enough, I received an answer within minutes. The reply contained additional information regarding the deal and was clearly a very bad Google translation of an English text. Again, this message was sent from the same IP-address. We emailed back and forth several times until I was asked to provide some ID, an address and a phone number. So I did.

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Apparently, Mr. Wong thought this was funny as well. For the first time I actually received a response that was not just copied and pasted from a pretext.

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“You dey gather my fmt” – This actually translates to: So, you are one of those guys that collect my pretext. At this point, Mr. Wong also started using a different email to communicate with me: wong.shiu@mail.com. Again, I checked each message header. While several different IPs were used, they all belonged to South African mobile providers.

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The conversation went on for quite a while and I was surprised that Mr. Wong kept answering.

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The following day I received another scam mail that looked just like to first one. The only difference  was that the name of the banker had changed (and thus the reply email) and the promised sum of money was a lot higher than in the first email. It sure looked like this was also the work of my friend Mr. Wong, so I decided to answer to this new email as well.

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Unfortunately, Mr. Wong did not answer any more. Looking into all the emails again, I could clearly see a pattern. Each IP-address could be traced to South African mobile providers and all emails were sent through Huawei 3G/4G WiFi routers. The language used also hinted towards Africa in general. Furthermore, over the course of two days I noticed that Mr. Wong began answering around 09:30 (CET), leading to the conclusion that he must have been in the same time zone (or nearby) if this was his 9 to 5 job.

If you ever try this yourself, please make sure to use a clean email address and do not download or open attachments. If you keep this in mind, you might have some fun with a Nigerian prince yourself. As for Mr. Wong:

Mr. Wong,

If you ever read this, feel free to contact me again. I can’t promise I’ll pay the advance fee you requested, but I’m always there for you if you need someone to chat.

Yours sincerely,

Matthias Wilson / 19.03.2019

Hijacking WhatsApp without Hacking

You don’t have to be a hacker to hijack a WhatsApp account. Simple mistakes made by your target can easily give you access to WhatsApp and other messaging apps on their phones.

When I participate in meetings, I notice that some people place their phones face-up on the table. As a curious person, I always tend to glance over at their phones whenever they light up, for instance if they receive messages. Many people actually have messages displayed on the lock screens. That means they do not have to pick up their phones and unlock them to read incoming messages. Unfortunately, this also poses a serious security threat. Not only can curious people like me read these, displaying the full content of messages on your lock screen can lead to your instant messaging accounts being hijacked. No sophisticated hacking skills are required to do so!

Imagine the following scenario:

A company CEO mainly uses WhatsApp to communicate with business partners. An attacker first obtains the phone number that is linked to his WhatsApp account. People search engines, such as Pipl, are helpful to identify a target’s mobile phone number. Using an Android VM, the attacker can then setup a fully functional Android phone on his computer, including the installation of WhatsApp. WhatsApp on the VM is then registered with a burner phone. The CEO’s phone number is added to the contacts and WhatsApp will provide a profile picture, username and status. This information is saved, as the attacker will need it later when hijacking the actual account.

As an alternative, we could also use a real burner phone or a little gimmick called WhatsAllApp to obtain the aforementioned information. WhatsAllApp is a Chrome extension, that enables you to gather WhatsApp profile pictures, statuses and usernames based on any given phone number, even without adding these to your contacts.

The next step must happen quickly and this is where it starts to get criminal. Our attacker steals the CEO’s phone and instantly registers a WhatsApp account on the Android VM (or burner phone), using the CEO’s phone number. Of course, this will only work if the CEO’s phone displays incoming messages on the lock screen. The SMS verification code is then used to register WhatsApp on the burner phone or in the VM. From now on, all incoming WhatsApp messages will show up on the attacker’s WhatsApp. This works with other messaging apps as well. Of course, the attacker cannot see the chat history, but he will be able to interact with the contacts from that point on and possibly gain vital intelligence.

Using this technique could give an attacker a 1-2 day timeframe to hijack WhatsApp and other messaging apps. As soon as the CEO notices his phone is stolen, he will obviously have his phone and SIM card locked. However, how many people would actually think about giving all their contacts a heads-up that they currently are not available? Quite a challenge without a phone.

So much for the theory behind such an attack. I have noticed that my colleague’s phone displays messages on the lock screen and his wife texts him quite often. I decided to hijack his phone this morning.

While he was in a meeting across the hall, he left his phone on the desk. I used his phone number to set up a WhatsApp account on my Android VM. The SMS verification was immediately visible on his lock screen, I didn’t even have to touch his phone.

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After entering this code, his account was mine! Of course, I used his profile picture, username and status in the hijacked account. Shortly afterwards I received the first incoming message. It was sent by his wife, asking about their lunch plans for the day (she works nearby). I texted back and suggested pizza, upon which his wife named a meeting place and time.

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When my colleague returned from his meeting, I was happy to inform him that he would be meeting his wife at 1230 in front of the mall and that they would have pizza.

There are several lessons to be learned here:

  1. DO NOT leave your phone unattended (especially around me)!
  2. DO NOT publically disclose your WhatsApp profile information (profile pic, username, status)!
  3. DO NOT enable your phone to display messages on the lock screen!
  4. If your phone is stolen, try to inform your contacts!

And as of now I will live in fear, because I am sure my colleague will retaliate this prank soon.

Matthias Wilson / 27.02.2019