When playing snooker, you sometimes have to rely on your opponent making a mistake to win the game. When conducting investigations, we also have to rely on the suspect to make mistakes, in order to solve the case.
A while back one of our customers, a large German cosmetic company, had received threatening emails from an unknown perpetrator. This person threatened to sabotage the company’s supply chain and thus cause a production fallout. The emails where sent from an anonymous email address and we were not able to find any information on the originator through OSINT. Over the course of the next weeks, the perpetrator continued to send threats and demands in various emails. One of the demands was to transfer a large sum of money to a Bitcoin account.
Again, we went looking for information online, trying to track down this Bitcoin account. Once more, we turned up empty handed. We tried every trick in the book, including trying to lure the perpetrator into a trap using phishing emails, which only resulted in him sending the threats from different email-addresses each time.
The only consistent information was the Bitcoin wallet address and the name he used to sign the emails. This name was ‘Ray Reardon’. Judging from the content of the emails, we had a hunch that this person might actually be an insider. He apparently had extensive knowledge of the company’s supply chain and internal procedures. Knowing this, we sat down with the company’s security officer and discussed the next steps. Our technical approach using OSINT and even phishing was exhausted and we agreed upon covert investigations within the company. In the first step, the security officer identified everyone that could have the knowledge displayed in the emails. We received a list of eight employees and also some written documents from each of these employees. We compared the documents to the emails, hoping we might find specific phrases, terms or spelling mistakes that match. As with the steps before, this proved inconclusive.
The suspects worked in different shifts and the company’s employees had no access to private IT or phones during their worktime. Each employee entered and left the building through doors that only opened with their personally issued RFID tag. We pulled the login data and compared it to the times that the emails had been sent and could rule out five of the suspects, as they were definitely still in the building at their workspaces. Furthermore, we had the IT department check if any company computers had accessed the websites of the email providers used to send the threat emails. So far, we started off with OSINT, then tried social engineering (phishing) and were now down to an internal forensic investigation.
These steps enabled us to narrow down the amount of suspects from eight to three. The remaining three suspects were off duty at the time the emails had been transmitted. We started conducting intensive background checks on all three, including looking at their social media and online footprints. While the checks on two of the suspects did not provide any further leads, one check revealed that the last remaining suspect was really into snooker and competed in regional snooker tournaments. This small and seemingly irrelevant information actually helped solve the case. Remember the name used to sign the threatening emails? It turns out ‘Ray Reardon’ is actually a famous snooker player. Combined with the fact that the suspect wasn’t at work in the relevant time period, the use of the name ‘Ray Reardon’ proved to be a circumstantial piece of evidence that our customer then handed over to the German law enforcement agencies. Subsequently, it was enough to get a search warrant for the suspect’s home.
Our customer later reported that the police had found more evidence on the suspect’s computer and that he was tried and convicted for attempted blackmail.
Our investigation was the frame ball* in this case.
foto by barfisch under license CC-BY-SA 3.0
MW-OSINT / 14.12.2018
*Snooker term: the last difficult shot required to win